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ON TAPP (AND LEVINE)
Michael J. Saks*
LAw, JUSTICE, AND THE lNDMDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL lssuEs. Edited by June Louin Tapp and Felice J.
Levine. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1977. Pp. xv,
446. $15.95.
The American Psychological Association is composed of
thirty-six divisions, one of which, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSS!), has existed since the 1930s as
an organized forum through which social scientists (predominantly social psychologists) can address social problems. For
years SPSS! has published the Journal of Social Issues as a vehicle for linking social science knowledge with what are seen in any
period as its important social problems. This occasionally can be
a depressing archive. As a graduate student in the earliest days
of this decade, I dusted off some JSI volumes from the '40s, curious. to know what the era's social problems were, only to discover that they were no different from those of the present. Some
historical reflection may assure (?) us that these are the eternal
problems, the fundamental issues of social existence: conflicts
over goals and methods, over resources, over principles of distributive justice, over the power to decide, and between groups associated with competing sides of these questions. The "solutions"
lie in improving our management of these conflicts, or in making
them productive; we cannot expect them to disappear.
The law and its associated institutions, of course, constitute
a major device for managing these conflicts. Recognizing this, JS[
in 1971 devoted an entire issue to a collection of articles on law
and psychology. That issue was edited by June Tapp, and it
forms the core of Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society.
The book is the most recent in a series sponsored by SPSSI,
more than a few of which ought to be of interest to legal scholars
and practitioners. Among them are Children's Rights and the
Mental Health Professions, Towards the Elimination of Racism,
Industrial Conflict, International Behavior, and Research Methods in Social Relations. The SPSSI series is prestigious in its
field, and its existence is a special tribute to the authors and
* Associate, National Center for State Courts. B.A. 1969, B.S. 1969, Pennsylvania
State University; M.A. 1973, Ph.D. 1975, Ohio State University.-Ed.
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editors who have produced it, because their contributions are
literally that: all royalties go to the Society.
June Louin Tapp, the senior editor of the volume under review and this year's president of SPSSI, would make anyone's list
of psychologists whose subject of study is the law and justice, and
on more than a few such lists, her name would be at the top. A
Professor of Child Psychology and Criminal Justice Studies and
Adjunct Professor of Law at the U:p.iversity of Minnesota and a
former fellow of the Harvard Law School, she has long been associated with the American Bar Foundation and has been an officer·
of the Law and Society Association and the American
Psychology-Law Society. It seems that whenever an editor wants
an article or chapter about the state of law and psychology, Professor Tapp is asked to write it, and apparently she usually does.
Tapp and her co-editor Felice Levine, a social psychologist and
Research Social Scientist at the American Bar Foundation, have
put together a volume that updates and extends that 1971 issue
of JSI and contains revised versions of the fourteen original chapters plus twelve new chapters. Most of the contributions are by
superstars at the intersection of law and social psychology or, at
the least, superstars of one field who make forays into the other:
Johanneas Andenaes, Harold Berman, James Davis, Paul
Freund, Lawrence Friedman, Lon Fuller, Sanford Kadish, Harry
Kalven, Lawrence Kohlberg, Stuart Macaulay, Paul Meehl, Soia
Mentschikoff, Ross Parke, Milton Rokeach, David 0. Sears,
Elaine Walster, Phillip Zimbardo, Franklin Zimring, and, of
course, June Tapp.
Law and psychology "interface" (as the vernacular would
have it) in three conceptually distinct and asymmetric ways.
First, psychology as a science or a profession must operate under
the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is practiced. Examples of
current interest include legal protections for human subjects in
federally funded research programs, tort liability for harm done
by psychologists to clinical clients or research subjects, and the
question whether clinical psychological services will be included
under National Health Insurance. This first category is given no
attention in Tapp and Levine's volume. This is not a weakness; I
offer the fact simply to suggest what the volume does address.
Indeed, most books on law and psychology ignore this area, perhaps because academic and scientific folks, unlike their professional cotmterparts in the ABA, AMA, or even the APA, tend to
be embarrassed by organized campaigns or statements in their
own interest.
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Second, law, the legal process, the legal system, and law-like
structures can be placed under the behavioral scientist's microscope. In this category, we find basic research, theory, and scholarly research and writing on psychology and law. And from this
category come virtually all the chapters in Tapp and Levine's
book. As the editors point out in their opening chapter, many of
the favorite topics of research psychologists-"processes of conflict, persuasion, control, authority, compliance, and morality
... socialization, decision-making, information processing, perception, memory, cognition, attitudes, group dynamics, and interpersonal relations ... "-are remarkably relevant to the law's
fundamental concerns about itself and society.
Third, psychological knowledge can serve the law. LaWYers,
legislators, judges, and others call on (or at least receive) the
findings of psychological research and theory to facilitate their
own work. Research toward this purpose is the most applied and
practical psychological research. The most familiar example is
the forensic clinical psychologist's appearance in trial or probate
courts to testify on questions of competency, dangerousness, sanity, and so_ on. This is also the most troubling example, because
it combines the worst of both psychology and the law: the least
sound psychological knowledge (e.g., Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony (1975)) used in what Szasz
(e.g., Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963)) and many others have
called the worst illustrations of due process. More current examples of this category are perception and memory researchers testifying in court and contributing to evidentiary policy regarding
eyewitness accuracy; social and personality psychologists assisting with jury selection; and psychologists (and other social scientists) assisting attorneys in preparing cases, appellate briefs, or
drafting legislation on any number of substantive matters.
When the subject matter of the law involves human behavior
(when doesn't it?), systematic, empirically based psychological
knowledge may inform the decisions. To the degree that the law
operates on itself-for example, to reform its own structure or
practices or to decide constitutional questions-research of the
second category can become instances of the third. Most of the
contributions to the Tapp and Levine volume, however, reside
comfortably within the second category. The contributions are by
no means irrelevant to practical reform, nor are the contributors
unaware of their work's possible utility. But our legal and political systems are not now actively employing most of this knowledge and appear unlikely soon to do so. The most dramatic exam-
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pie of this is Shuman's conclusion (chapter 19) that the criminal
law should be scrapped altogether and replaced by expanded tort
remedies.
At first blush, Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society:
Psychological and Legal Issues sounds like a label that could
describe almost anything. The table of contents reveals, however,
that the title is actually a careful description of what is between
the covers. The book places law, justice, and the individual
within the larger society. It is genuinely "social psychological" in
that its interest is the effect of social structures and institutions,
primarily the law, on individuals. The book examines all influences at the situational or structural level and measures all effects at the individual level. By so doing, it emphasizes the processes that mediate collective goals and social institutions in their
effect on the behavior of individuals. The volume's four major
sections consider (1) law as a socializing agency, (2) conceptions
of justice as a matter of cognitive social development, (3) how
people come to be socialized to perceive and behave in terms of
legal systems, and (4) decision-making in legal contexts. The
volume looks not just at our society's "law," but at law-like systems and behavior related to law, comparatively between cultures, and developmentally across age cohorts.
What is there to be learned from these chapters? Let me offer
several discrete findings.
1. The American legal system is primarily adversary (Nimmer,

chapter 20).
2. Although people naturally want to avoid compensating people
whom their negligence has harmed, the legal system encourages
the negligent to make equitable compensation (Macaulay and
Waister, chapter 21).
3. If children are raised to have positive attitudes toward individual freedom, they are more likely as adults to tolerate the exercise
of rights by fellow citizens (Zellman and Sears, chapter 11).
4. The decisions made by fact-finders such as arbitration panels
or juries are determined primarily by the decision-makers' personal biases (Haggard and Mentschikoff, chapter 22).

The reader who regards these propositions as obvious and not
requiring the resources spent on them has helped make an important point, one that Meehl (chapter 2) propounds, about the
value of empirical social research to the law. Although the above
propositions probably square with common sense, they are actually the opposite of what researchers found:
1. The legal process in the United States is characterized by cooperative relations, settlements, and the exchange of vital infor-
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mation by opposing counsel; only a very few disputes result in trial
and its attendant adversary procedures.
2. Except under specifiable conditions, people's sense of equity
presses them to compensate those they accidentally harm; the
processes by which lawyers, courts, and insurance companies resolve claims actually reduce the negligent's tendency to compensate.
3. Children, like adults, endorse freedom as an abstract principle
but do not carry that endorsement through to concrete situations.
4. Although biases of fact-finders have clear effects, the issues
identified as central to the dispute itself are more powerful determinants of decisions.

Presumably, had I given the actual findings first, those, too,
would have been regarded as obvious facts not calling for research. This exercise illustrates a lesson about the study of law
and justice-or, indeed, most other things-by social scientists:
there are no "obvious" findings. Most outcomes are plausible.
Ergo, once the findings are in, many commentators find them
"obvious" whichever way they go. (Senator Proxmire take note.)
The important contribution of an empirical study of the law and
society is that it places some limits on theory, commentary, and
speculation about the nature of law-related behavior and the solutions to our legal and quasi-legal problems. By using empirical
knowledge to pin down borders, such a study confines conceptualizing within them. A theory derived within those borders limits
speculation and expands possible solutions to problems.
Quite a few of the chapters of the book are noteworthy, if not
outstanding. Some are excellently crafted, thoughtful essays
(e.g., Kadish and Kadish, chapter 24). Others skillfully weave
data with theory and social philosophy (e.g., Zellman and Sears,
chapter 11). The volume includes important studies and theories
by people centrally identified with the work reported (e.g., Macaulay and Walster on "Legal Structures and Restoring Equity,"
chapter 21; Haney and Zimbardo on "The Socialization into
Criminality: On Becoming' a Prisoner and a Guard," chapter 17).
One contribution is nothing less than a classic and became so the
moment it first reached print; no one interested in law and psychology should fail to read Meehl's "Law and the Fireside Inductions" (chapter 2). Some chapters are disappointing. Harry Kalven has elsewhere brilliantly and literately woven data and ideas
(one of my favorites is The Dignity of the Civil Jury 1). But his
contribution to this volume is not such a tapestry. By and large,
1. 50 VA. L. R.Ev. 1055-75 (1964).
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however, it is not difficult to find something worthwhile in almost
all the chapters.
Stylistically, the contributions leave more room for debate.
The chapters are uneven. One contains a lengthy, careful, and
painstaking review of empirical research. Another is composed of
conclusions loosely drawn from some soft evidence. Another analyzes legal practice in terms of a particular social psychological
theory. Yet another is very brief and speculative. Others are original reports or re-reports of empirical research. I am not inclined
to call this unevenness a weakness, however, particularly to those
using the book as a teaching tool or as an introduction to law and
psychology. The book's mix of original reports~ reviews of literature, theoretical pieces, speculation, and theoretical analyses of
the legal system offers students a sampler of the ways in which
research and thinking go on in law -and psychology.
There is much, then; to praise about Law, Justice, and· the
Individual in Society-its contributors; the broad, basic questions it addresses; and the personal moral wrestling several contributors, especially the editors, frankly do in identifying their
own role in studying law, justice, and society. Shall we make the
law more "effective," thereby taking a measure of autonomy from
individual people; or shall we increase· their capacity to scruti~
nize, decide, and, if they see fit, to disobey particular laws? Shall
the law be a device for social control or a facilitator of greater
independence? The editors opt for "critical compliance" and
whatever that implies.
·
If I did not find something to complain about, in this or any
book, I would be either remiss or disingenuous. We are now witnessing the greatest of the periodic explosions of interest by lawyers and social scientists in each other ever to occur. This decade
has seen more J.D.-Ph.D.s, new journals, new organizations, new
programs, new funding sources, new outlets, and new· employment options than ever before. Containing as it does so many of
the established stars of the law-psychology intersection, this
volume represents largely a summing up of much of the scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s, pre-explosion, as it were. (It is impressive to see how much went on prior to the current explosion.)
At least two of the contributors have already died, and most
others are professors emeriti, deans, or at least full professors.
Certainly I do not include every author in this broad sweep. Nor
do I mean any derogation of those I do include, for their scholarly
contributions are enormously valuable and have long been respected by the rest of the field, including me. Nor do I wish to
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create a generation gap, when one of the most rewarding aspects
of scholarly work is that one's vigor can increase with age. But
while this is an est~emed assembly, it represents largely the
accomplishments that have been, and less those that are.
A field of research is only as good as its next finding. The
future of this field, if recent work by its rising stars-largely unrepresented in this volume-is any example, is bright indeed. Their
work will be at once more rigorous and more relevant. They are
altogether more comfortable with theory and with application.
More of their work will occur in all three of the categories. It will
be, and perhaps already is, what is represented by this volume,
and then some. Both social science and society will be the beneficiaries.

